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Abstract
Public good provision is often determined through referendums by voters, who weigh benefits
against costs. We evaluate voter perceptions of the private costs of providing public goods by
conducting three exit polls of New England voters and an online survey of California voters. By
comparing cost perceptions to actual tax incidence, we find pervasive evidence that voters
misperceive costs. Fewer than 20% of voters in our samples reported perceived costs within 25%
of true costs. Further, our analysis suggests that actual costs have no statistical bearing on voter
choice, but at least in the New England sample voter approval is affected by perceived costs.
Thus, misperceptions of referendum costs can lead to voter choice errors, misallocation of public
funds, and casts doubt on nonmarket valuation methods predicated on perfect information using
voter behavior.
Keywords: Price elasticity, Perceived cost, Economics of information, Public goods,
Referendum, Nonmarket valuation
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1 Introduction
Public goods are underprovided in a pure market economy. To rectify this market failure,
governments intervene in several ways. Federal and state governments can legislate standards
(i.e., Clean Air Act) and budgetary provision (i.e., National Parks). Municipal, county, and state
governments also rely on referendums, through which voters directly authorize expenditures for
public goods. Every year, millions of Americans directly vote on public good referendums and
authorize billions of dollars in public spending for schools, infrastructure, and the environment.
An open question however is to what extent these mechanisms supply public goods that match
preferences of constituents.
This paper examines referendum voting behavior and specifically probes voters’
understanding of referendum costs. A neoclassical model of voting behavior would stipulate that
a referendum states a quantity of public good and a price, and the voter performs a cost-benefit
calculation to decide their choice. However, if voters misperceive costs, then those individuals’
calculations could be wrong, and people may not be voting consistently with their own
preferences.
We developed two surveys, an exit poll and an online survey, that asked voters how they
voted or planned to vote on a local or state referendum and how much in additional taxes they
would pay if the referendum passed. We incentivized accuracy in stated cost estimates by
offering $5 cash to respondents for estimates within 10% of their actual cost, which was
calculated in real time based on respondents’ reported housing value, rent, or income and the
specifics of the referendum. 1 The survey also asked about votes for governor and demographic
information, as well as questions measuring financial literacy and political knowledge. We
conducted our exit poll survey in three New England (NE) municipalities with municipal
referendums appearing on their November 2018 ballot. We sought variation in our sample, and
to this end chose municipalities in three different states, each targeting a different public good
(open space, smart growth, road repairs). Since each municipal referendum was funded by
property taxes, for purposes of generalizability we additionally examine a 2020 California (CA)
bond referendum on stem cell research because it was funded through income and sales taxes.

1

Bullock et al. (2015) and Zimmermann (2020) find that monetary incentives mitigate motivated reasoning, which
could be an issue here if, for example, voters who rejected the referendum stated very high cost estimates to
demonstrate why they voted no and perhaps how they feel about government spending in general.
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We conducted this survey online using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All surveys were
anonymous and self-administered, which mitigates social desirability bias (e.g., Bishop and
Fisher 1995). We collected 347 completed surveys in the NE exit polls and 442 surveys in the
CA online survey. All three New England referendums passed by sizable margins, but the CA
referendum just barely passed with 51.1% approval.
The first thrust of our analysis is to assess voter understanding of cost, and our findings
clearly indicate that voters do not understand the personal financial consequences of their vote.
In the NE sample, only 45.2% of respondents even stated a cost estimate, which is telling given
the cash incentive and costless guess. The proportion of guessers was larger in the CA sample,
77.6%, but still remarkable given people are on MTurk with the expressed motivation to make
money. 2 Regression analysis shows that respondents with greater financial literacy were more
likely to state a cost estimate and some evidence that referendum approval, higher income, and
political party non-affiliation are more likely to guess, but no other variables are statistically
significant correlates of guessing. Among respondents that did register a guess, very few are
close to their actual cost; only 17.7% of NE and 19.4% of CA voters guessed within 25
percentage points of the actual cost and there is no statistical correlation between perceived and
actual costs. Further, there is evidence of a common pattern in guesses: perceived cost
distributions are similar across the three NE municipalities and CA despite large actual cost
differences, which suggests that voters may have similar beliefs that are decoupled from reality.
Additional results find no consistent evidence that any type of respondent is more or less likely
to have correct cost perception.
The second thrust of analysis is to estimate voter choice models and assess the degree to
which approval is determined by either stated or actual cost. The NE exit poll results suggest that
stated cost has a negative and statistically significant impact on approval, as would be expected
for the cost parameter (downward sloping demand), but actual cost has a statistically
insignificant effect and the coefficient is positive. From these models, we can estimate average
willingness to pay for referendum approval, similar to the analysis of a binary contingent
valuation choice experiment. Using stated cost, we estimate a WTP of $1,011, whereas using
actual cost we estimate a WTP of -$163, which is unreasonable given the large margin of

2

In both surveys, 100% of respondents who did not answer the open-ended question did answer a follow-up
multiple choice question on stated costs.
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approval. In the CA analysis, coefficients on both stated and actual cost have the same signs
observed in the NE exit poll sample, though both are statistically insignificant from zero,
indicating that neither real nor perceived cost has much influence on approval. Calculated WTP
estimates are similar to the NE results with WTP equal to $1,143 using stated cost and -$114
using actual costs. The difference in statistical importance of perceived cost could be due to state
versus municipal funding, but this is speculative and more research is needed.
In sum, the results provide suggestive evidence that voters are responsive to price, but
have incomplete information about the correct price, and are responding to the misperceived
price. The implications are that 1) the opacity of true costs may lead some voters to vote against
their preferences and referendum outcomes to not reflect aggregate preferences, 2) improved
understanding of prices may have a substantial impact on which referendums voters approve and
align the provision of public goods with voters’ true preferences, and 3) demand modeling using
voting data may be biased due to voters misunderstanding of prices.
Our findings contribute to several literatures. First, this article contributes to a growing
literature on cost (or price) misperceptions. In other information-scarce contexts, there is
evidence that water and electricity customers misperceive prices when making consumption
decisions under nonlinear rate structures (Brent and Ward 2019, Ito 2014, Wichman 2014) and
that customers may be rationally inattentive to energy costs when investing in energy-using
durable goods (Sallee 2014). When consumers make consumption decisions in these settings
with imperfect information about price, this drives a wedge between consumers’ perceived utility
and experienced utility. In the parlance of Allcott and Taubinsky (2015), this “internality”
captures the private costs of individuals making wrong decisions due to imperfect information. In
the case of decisions that impose external costs on others (e.g., like electricity or water
consumption), misperceived costs can exacerbate these externalities. 3 There is a direct
correspondence with misperceptions of private costs when voting on public goods. With
imperfect information about private costs, voters may vote to approve public goods, thus
imposing the costs of provision on themselves and others, without fully realizing the financial
3

In the case of residential electricity use, many studies find that customers misperceive the cost of electricity to be
lower than it actually is, causing consumers to use more electricity than their fully informed self, which increases the
social costs from electricity usage (e.g., Jessoe and Rapson 2014). For residential water use, however, there is
mounting evidence that water customers overperceive the price of water (e.g., Attari 2014, Brent and Ward 2019),
and thus providing customers with more information about consumption costs may increase water consumption
(Wichman 2017).
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burden of their decision. Or the opposite, they vote to reject and the measure fails, thus depriving
the community of additional public goods even though the benefits outweigh the true costs. We
extend this literature on misperceived prices by providing evidence of voters’ misperception of
private costs of voting for ballot measures. We find strong evidence that voters have substantial
misperceptions of private costs, and because perceived costs can be an important determinant of
voter approval, voting errors are likely. We present a back-of-the-envelope analysis that indicates
5.5% of voters in our NE sample and 2.9% in our CA sample would have switched their vote if
misperceived prices were corrected. Scouring myriad sources (Trust for Public Land, Cellini et
al. 2010, Isen 2014), between 17% and 38% of referendums are within 5% of the passage
threshold, which in turn indicates a decent likelihood of externalities resulting from cost
misperceptions.
This article also contributes to a strand of research in economics that uses voting data on
real-world referendums to estimate voter preferences and infer valuation. Votes are a powerful
source of revealed preferences that additionally can yield insights about political economy. How
referendum cost is handled varies across studies. Some articles simply do not include a cost
measure in their model of voter choice (Wu and Cutter 2011, Holian and Kahn 2015, Altonji et
al. 2016), which is problematic because cost is correlated with socioeconomic characteristics that
are included. Others make comparisons across jurisdictions and assess how aggregate support
varies with the funding vehicle (e.g., property tax, bonds) and the amount of revenue to be raised
(Kotchen and Powers 2006, Banzhaf et al. 2010). As these authors note, interpretation of cost is
difficult in these specifications because increasing cost also implies increasing public goods. In
contrast, Burkhardt and Chan (2017), Vander Naald and Cameron (2017), and Anderson et al.
(2019) study statewide referendums and examine how spatial variation in household cost
correlates with support and use these estimates to calculate WTP for public goods. One critical
assumption of these models is that voters correctly perceive costs; if this assumption fails, as we
find, then estimated WTP is unlikely to reflect true WTP. 4 However, Vossler et al. (2003) find
indirect evidence that voters are well-informed about cost. 5 That being said, based on our
4

A second critical assumption is that aggregate voting data can be used to recover individual preferences. Lang and
Pearson-Merkowitz (2022) examine this issue and find aggregate voting is likely to produce biased estimates.
5
These authors conduct a contingent valuation survey using the same language as actual referendums taking place
around the same time. However, half of respondents received additional information about referendum cost, and
regression results suggest that the additional information has no impact on approval. However, as discussed in the
article, this particular referendum was part of the public discourse and was held in a small college town, which is not
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findings on a variety of referendums, voter knowledge of costs is likely the exception rather than
the rule.
Lastly, this article contributes to a long-standing debate about whether voters have
enough knowledge of referendums and initiatives to choose correctly, and hence whether direct
democracy as an institution can reflect true preferences. The information requirements to
correctly vote with your preferences are much greater with initiatives than with electing
representatives because there are fewer cues and no history with a given political party and their
general policy priorities (Bowler and Donovan 2000). Bowler (2015) finds that two-thirds of
surveyed voters in California felt ballot question wording was confusing and 20% were
unsatisfied with the amount of information provided on the ballot. Burnett (2019) finds that
voters are far more knowledgeable about endorsements than specific facts about initiatives and
campaign spending helps voters learn about relevant endorsements but not facts. 6 Bowler and
Donovan (2000) conclude that voters are not well informed but most use reasoning and cues to
make correct choices. Our paper documents a new area of incorrect information, the individual
price tag of a referendum. This in itself is not surprising given the documented ignorance about
proposed policy specifics. However, we additionally find evidence that incorrect prices have a
statistically significant effect on voters’ choices, meaning that in this case, Bowler and
Donovan’s (2000) optimism about uninformed voters making correct choices may not hold. 7

2 Conceptual framework
We begin by developing a voter choice model, and then we show how misperceived
referendum costs can lead to both individual voting errors and biased estimates of willingness to
pay (WTP). Consider the following voter choice model for an individual voter i:

true for the vast majority of local public finance referendums. Tangential evidence of voters’ understanding of
financial consequences comes from empirical tests of Fischel’s (2001) homevoter hypothesis, which argues that
homeowners’ approval of local public finance issues is based in part on the expected impact to their home value,
which capitalizes both tax increases and amenity values (Cellini et al. 2010, Lang 2018). However, votes may still
reflect self-interest even if benefit or cost perceptions are imperfect. Further, recent empirical tests (e.g., Dehring et
al. 2008, Ahlfeldt and Maennig 2015) come from large place-based decision (stadium, airport), which is far more
salient than an average referendum.
6
Dyck and Lascher (2019) also find that state-level initiatives increase voter participation but not voters’ interest in
politics.
7
Prendergast et al. (2019) conduct a national survey that elicits perceptions of the amount of local open space and
then they derive actual amounts at multiple spatial scales for each georeferenced respondent. Similar to this study,
there is a large degree of misperception in open space abundance, and when asked about a hypothetical open space
referendum, respondents’ votes were statistically responsive to perceived open space, but not actual.
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𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 𝜸𝜸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(1)

where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is the latent expected utility voter i would derive from the referendum if it passes, 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
is the annual dollar value of actual cost (from additional taxes) that the voter would face if the

referendum passes, and 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 is a vector of voter attributes. We expect that 𝛽𝛽 < 0 to be consistent
with microeconomic theory. The vote cast, which is observed, is determined by the sign of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ,

specifically 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 1(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > 0). Within this context, voter i would only vote in favor of a
referendum that provides positive expected utility.

The model described above assumes that individual voters have full information on the
costs of the policy. There are good reasons to believe that the cognitive effort to calculate
changes in tax burdens are significant, especially when ballots do not communicate them clearly.
To incorporate cost misperception into this framework, we include 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 as a misperception

�𝚤𝚤 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 .
parameter, such that perceived cost equals true cost scaled by misperception, 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1 implies perfectly accurate cost perception, which is the typical modeling assumption,

𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1 implies that voter i underestimates costs, and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 1 implies that voter i overestimates
costs. 8 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 can also be thought of as the ratio of perceived costs to actual costs.

Incorporating misperception into the choice model above we have the following:
�𝚤𝚤 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 𝜸𝜸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 𝜸𝜸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡

(2)

where 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖∗ is latent utility if the referendum passes with the perceived cost of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 . Similarly,

� 𝚤𝚤 = 1(𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖∗ > 0).
the vote cast is defined 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒

It is straightforward to show how cost misperception can influence individual voter

expected utility and potentially vote choice. By differencing Equations 1 and 2 we observe the
following relationships between latent utilities conditional on misperception:
𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖∗

−

< 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 1
0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1
> 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 < 1

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ �=

(3)

In words, if costs are overestimated, then expected utility is less than if true costs were known.
Similarly, if costs are underestimated, then expected utility is greater than if true costs were
known. If 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 deviates substantially from one or if 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is near zero, then cost misperception can
lead to an error in vote choice; the real vote deviates from what is optimal under perfect

8

This perception parameter is defined analogously in water, electricity, and energy efficiency settings where
individuals misperceive the costs of their actions (Ito, 2014; Sallee, 2014, Wichman, 2014; Brent and Ward, 2019).
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� 𝚤𝚤 ≠ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 . In this instance, it is useful to think of the wedge between
information: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒

perceived costs and actual costs as an internality, à la Allcott and Sunstein (2015), which leads to
self-caused errors in choices. Further, if a sufficient proportion of voters misperceive costs, it is
feasible that the referendum will pass when it should fail or fail when it should pass and an
inefficient amount of the public good is provided.
We now turn our attention to the issue of researchers analyzing voting data to understand
valuation of public goods. Researchers observe real votes (or more typically aggregated real
votes) that are a function of misperceived costs, but they do not observe misperception and
instead calculate true costs (e.g., Burkhardt and Chan, 2017). Hence, they may estimate a logistic
regression model similar to:
� 𝚤𝚤 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 𝜸𝜸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒

(4)

While regressing true votes on perceived costs or regressing votes under perfect information on
true costs would both reveal true preferences, the mismatch of true votes on true costs in
Equation (4) does not. Researchers are often interested in voter choice because it provides a
means to estimate the value of public goods. For this, researchers can estimate average WTP
using the regression estimates following the method developed by Hanemann (1984, 1989):
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 =

1

−𝛽𝛽̂

�

ln�1 + 𝑒𝑒 �𝛽𝛽0+𝑿𝑿�𝜸𝜸�� �

(5)

�0, 𝛽𝛽̂ , and 𝛾𝛾� are estimated logit parameters and 𝑿𝑿
� is a vector of sample average values.
where 𝛽𝛽

Given the inaccuracy of parameter estimates from Equation (4), average WTP will be incorrect
as well.
What we hope to communicate through this conceptual framework is that voting behavior
and analysis of voting behavior both hinge critically on voters understanding their true individual
costs. In the following sections, we examine the extent to which perceived costs deviate from
actual costs among voters and how those misperceptions can be consequential for voters and
analysts.

3 Data
3.1 New England referendums and actual cost calculation
We surveyed three municipalities that held referendums in the November 2018 election.
We chose municipalities that offered variation in geography, the purpose of the referendum, and
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the financing mechanism. Table 1 provides summary information about our three survey towns:
Cumberland, RI, Plainville, MA, and South Windsor, CT. Cumberland’s referendum was for
street pavement improvements and requested authorization for the town to sell $2.5 million in
bonds. Plainville’s referendum was to adopt the Community Preservation Act (CPA), which is a
statewide Massachusetts program that provides state matching funds for municipalities that
increase property taxes for the CPA. Funds raised through the CPA must be spent in three
categories, open space conservation, affordable housing, and historic preservation, and each
category must get at least 10% of funds raised. 9 Plainville proposed a 1% increase in property
taxes, applied only to property value exceeding $100,000. South Windsor’s referendum focused
on open space acquisition and requested authorization for the town to sell $2 million in bonds.
All three referendums passed by large margins, ranging from 66-88% approval. 10
For each referendum, we calculated how much each household could expect to pay in
additional property taxes. This calculation is straightforward for Plainville as it only requires an
individual’s property value. For municipalities issuing bonds, the calculation requires calculating
the total property tax base in a town and each housing unit’s share of that total. For renters, we
estimate the sales equivalent of their property and assume that there is perfect pass through of
additional property taxes to rental rates. Table 1 presents average household costs and Table A.1
in the online appendix presents a more detailed picture of expected payments for different
housing values and rents. For Cumberland, RI and South Windsor, CT, we report total costs,
because this is how our cost perception question was phrased, but also report annual costs in
square brackets below for comparison purposes. 11 For example, the total average household cost
in Cumberland is $184.71, and we calculate that the corresponding annual tax payment is $19.50.

3.2 Survey design and implementation
For the NE exit poll, teams of three trained, graduate and undergraduate student pollsters
were stationed at three polling locations, one for each sample town, starting at 7am and staying
until dusk. Pollsters would approach voters as they left the poll, asking if they would be willing
to take a survey that was confidential, anonymous, and to be used for research purposes only.

9

See https://www.communitypreservation.org/ for more information.
The online appendix presents exact wording of each ballot question.
11
We convert these total bond costs to annual using an assumption of a 10-year payback with 1% interest.
10

9

Surveys were self-administered and completed on tablets, which mitigates social desirability
bias. Teams were also equipped with pop-up canopies in case of rain, and students wore
University of Rhode Island clothing and buttons that identified them as a “University of Rhode
Island Exit Poller.”
The key question of the survey asked respondents about their understanding of their
personal cost of the referendum they just voted on. The exact question wording was: “If the
[referendum name] is approved, how much do you think your household will end up paying for it
[per year]?”. “Per year” was only included in Plainville because that referendum’s cost was
stated as an annual property tax increase. The question intentionally did not mention payment
mechanism (property taxes) in order to not confuse renters, who may not connect their rental
rates to property taxes. Importantly, the survey offered a fill-in-the-blank box for their response.
This format avoids anchoring bias that could be present if we offered multiple choice options or
a slider bar with a given range. To be clear, the question was designed to elicit voters’ perception
of how much their household would pay if the referendum passes, rather than what they are
willing to pay for implementing the referendum. Anchoring bias could obfuscate misperception
assessment.
In order to incentivize truthful and thoughtful responses, the question said that if their
estimate was correct, they would be paid $5 cash. When recruiting voters, pollsters also
advertised that participants could earn $5. Later in the survey, we asked whether they rented or
owned, and subsequently how much their house was currently worth or how much they currently
pay in monthly rent. For both the house value and rent question, the survey initially offered a fillin-the-blank box for the response, but if respondents selected that they did not know, they were
then prompted with the same question, but given multiple choice options. Fully 100% of
respondents who did not answer the open-ended cost question did answer the multiple choice
question, which suggests that nonresponse is a function of high cognitive costs rather than this
question being “sensitive” or voters being too time-constrained to register a guess. Note that
although we are surveying voters on their perceived costs, we are not eliciting their willingnessto-pay for the referendum, which would be more in line with stated-preference studies. Rather,
we ask voters about their perceived private costs after they just voted for/against the referenda;
this is more akin to intercepting customers after grocery shopping and surveying them on the
salience of tax-inclusive prices for good they just purchased (e.g., as in Chetty et al. 2009). We
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programmed the survey in Qualtrics and had logical expressions embedded to determine if they
got the amount correct based on their reported housing value (within 10% of what we estimated),
and then displayed a final screen that stated if they got it correct and were entitled to $5. 12
The first two questions of the survey asked how the respondent just voted for governor
and for the referendum. The exact wording of the referendum was presented in the survey when
asking how they voted. These questions were followed by the cost question, after which the
survey additionally asked about the respondent’s household income, age, and educational
attainment. Lastly, the survey asked two questions measuring financial literacy and one
measuring political knowledge. The financial literacy questions concerned bank accounts,
interest rates, and inflation rates, and were taken directly from Lusardi and Mitchell (2014). The
political knowledge question asked about John Roberts’ job. 13

3.3 California Proposition 14, actual cost calculation, and survey design differences
For reasons of generalizability and potential concerns about relying on self-reported
property values to measure misperception of costs (see footnote 12), we chose to also survey
voters in a statewide referendum, funded by income and sales taxes, in a different part of the
country. Further, one can imagine scenarios in which voters are more or less informed about
municipal versus statewide referendums, and similarly scenarios in which property taxes may be
more or less salient than income and sales taxes.

12

One concern is that respondents may inaccurately report the market value of their home due to ignorance, which
would lead to measurement error in our actual cost calculation and incorrect conclusions about cost misperception.
Our survey was designed to be anonymous to mitigate social desirability bias, and thus we did not ask for their
address and cannot validate their house value. However, in a non-anonymous survey in Rhode Island, Bakkensen
and Barrage (2021) find a very strong correlation (ρ=0.89) between self-reported market value and the Zillow
Zestimate, suggesting reassurance with our cost calculation. Further, in 2018, the New England property market was
quite stable, with only modest appreciation over the past five years, unlike the rapid appreciation occurring during
2020-2021, which would give owners plenty of time to learn the value of their home. Lastly, while some error is
expected in a respondent’s estimate of their home’s value, the magnitude of errors in referendum cost estimates
cannot be due to this error alone. In our NE Exit Poll sample, 64% of respondents guess a referendum cost that is
over 50% off of their true cost. If that was entirely due to inaccuracy in home value estimates, it would be as if a
person with a home worth $300,000 reported it having a value less than $150,000 or greater than $600,000, which
seems implausible. Further, approximately equal numbers of respondents guessed above true cost as below,
indicating our cost calculation is not uniformly biased upwards or downwards. Finally, the way we calculate an
individual’s tax burden is to distribute the total tax bill of the referendum to all properties proportional on value. So,
if all properties are assessed at a lower percentage of their market value, that would not affect the distribution of this
new tax bill and the resulting estimates of private costs.
13
Complete text of the survey is available in the online appendix.
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As a second case study, we chose California Proposition 14, which appeared on the
November 3, 2020 general election ballot and, if passed, would authorize the state to issue $5.5
billion in general obligation bonds for stem cell research. Bond repayment comes from general
revenue, which is over 90% personal income and sales taxes. The referendum barely passed with
51.1% approval. See Table 1 for a summary and the online appendix for exact ballot language.
Accounting for interest payments, the California Attorney General estimated bond
repayment would cost the state $260 million per year for 30 years (this estimate actually appears
in the language on the ballot). Using tax rates and population statistics, we determined the
proportion of annual Proposition 14 payments that would be paid by different income groups and
then calculated lower and upper bounds of annual payments by income bin, which are displayed
in appendix Table A.2. The average cost to CA households is about $20.53, but the median is
only $10.26. Full details on our cost estimates can be found in the appendix.
We recruited online survey respondents through Amazon Mechanical Turk (denoted
“MTurk”) between October 27 and November 4, 2020. Eligible respondents were 1) aged 18
years or older, 2) lived in California, and 3) were planning to vote or already voted in the 2020
election. Respondents were guaranteed compensation of $1.00 upon completion of a “10-minute
Academic Study”. It was advertised in the task description that respondents would have the
opportunity to earn bonus payments in addition to the guaranteed $1.00 compensation. We
implemented best practices from the literature to avoid multiple survey attempts by the same
MTurk workers paired with methods to screen out respondents attempting to take the survey
from outside the United States (Moss and Litman 2018; Kennedy et al. 2018; Waggoner et al.
2019). Further details on survey distribution can be found in the appendix.
After answering a set of basic demographic questions (race, income, gender, education,
home ownership status), respondents were shown the text of Proposition 14 from the California
state ballot and asked how they voted/planned to vote on Proposition 14. Mirroring the New
England survey, respondents were then presented with the key question of the survey that asked
them to estimate how much Proposition 14 would cost their household annually if it were to pass
using a fill-in-the-blank box for their response. Respondents were told at the end of the survey
whether their guess was correct to incentivize completion of the full survey. If respondents
correctly estimated their household cost within 10% of our estimated range (similar to the New
England survey), they were awarded $5 upon completion of the survey. Similar to the NE Exit
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Poll survey, if respondents did not answer the open-ended question, we provided them with a
follow-up multiple choice question on their private cost. Respondents were randomly shown one
of three sets of answer choices to avoid anchoring bias. The survey concluded with questions
regarding political affiliation, financial literacy, and political knowledge. We chose to ask about
general political affiliation instead of vote for president because President Trump was a
polarizing and controversial candidate.

3.4 Summary statistics
A total of 347 voters completed our NE exit poll and 428 people completed our CA
online survey. Each of these sample sizes were the result of a series of sample cuts to account for
incompleteness and data quality checks. The sample cuts for the NE exit poll were straight
forward: a respondent was dropped from the exit poll sample if they did not complete the full
survey. In the MTurk sample, respondents were dropped if they did not complete the full survey
or completed the survey in less than one-half the median sample response time. Further, some
MTurk respondents had extremely high cost estimates, the likes of which were not present in the
NE sample. Seven respondents guessed $260 million, equal to the total annual cost for the whole
state, and 13 more guessed over $100,000. We assume these types of respondents did not
understand the question and thus should not be included in the sample. We exclude respondents
from the CA sample if their stated cost estimate was greater than $1000. We acknowledge that
this cutoff is arbitrary and perform a sensitivity check on this sample truncation in the appendix.
In Cumberland and South Windsor, our sample approved of the referendum at a similar
proportion to the official vote (86.7% approve in Cumberland and 75.8% approve in South
Windsor). However, in Plainville, our sample consisted disproportionately of approvers – 77.1%,
which is over 11 percentage points higher than the official count. A similar situation occurred in
the CA online survey in which 78.5% of the sample voted to approve Proposition 14 which is
27.4 percentage points higher than the true outcome. To counteract this, we calculate sample
weights that equate our sampled approval rates to official outcomes in all sample locations. This
has little consequence for respondents in Cumberland and South Windsor, but for Plainville and
the CA online sample the weights give more statistical influence to respondents that voted
“reject”.
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for both samples using sample weights. In New
England, about 77% voted in favor of the studied referendums and about 48% voted for the
Democratic nominee for governor 14, while 51.1% of the California sample voted in favor of the
referendum and 39.7% reported a Democratic affiliation. About 70% of both samples report
having a college degree, which is considerably higher than the general population in each
geographic area sampled and the national average of 31.5%. It is well-documented that the
voting population does not mirror the general population; voters tend to be better educated,
wealthier, and older (Leighley and Nagler 2013, Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2022). On
average, respondents answered 1.3 of the two financial literacy questions correctly in New
England while respondents in California answered 1.5 of the two questions correctly, which is
consistent with recent survey evidence from the general population (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014).
About 60% answered the political knowledge question correctly in New England while about
80% answered the same question correctly in California.
Only 45.3% of New England respondents decided to answer the question about
referendum cost while 83.5% of the California sample answered the cost question. 15 We interpret
the lower proportion of cost guesses in the New England sample as strong evidence that many
voters are uninformed about costs. If respondents checked “do not know” they were provided
with a follow-up multiple choice question. In both samples, 100% of respondents answered the
multiple choice question (N=190 in NE Exit Poll; N=96 in CA MTurk), which we interpret as
evidence that the cognitive costs of even registering a guess are large without having multiple
choice answers to provide reasonable bounds on private costs. The second column gives sample
statistics for the 157 and 346 respondents that did answer the cost question in the NE and CA
samples, respectively. On average, New Englanders overestimated how much their household
would pay, guessing $243 when it was closer to $187. The degree of overestimation was
substantially higher by Californians who guessed their household cost to be $144 while the
actual cost was closer to $15 on average for our respondents. However, these statistics hide
substantial heterogeneity by town and by individual, which will be explored in the next section.
14
43.3% voted for the Republican nominee, and the remainder voted for an independent. No independents ran in
Massachusetts.
15
Note that we present summary statistics using sample weights. The sample sizes among all CA MTurk
respondents and those who answered the referendum are 428 and 332, respectively, meaning ~78% of respondents
answered the cost question. This differs from the 83.5% statistic presented in Column 1 of Table 1 because of the
application of sample weights.
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Several characteristics are similar between columns, with referendum approval, governor choice
(in New England), age, political knowledge, and the distribution of responses all being about the
same across those who guess and those who do not. We examine determinants of answering the
cost question and correlates of accuracy using multiple regression in the next section. For most
analyses, we omit respondents that did not answer the open-ended cost elicitation question.
While these respondents did answer the multiple choice cost elicitation question, in hindsight,
the choices presented were too accurate. Pooling both types of respondents makes the multiple
choice respondents appear more accurate, but that is purely an artifact of the small range of
options in the question.

4 Results
4.1 Cost misperception
4.1.1 Evidence of misperception from raw data
We first document evidence of voters’ misperception of the private costs associated with
their vote. In Figure 1, we plot the distribution of stated costs from the NE Exit Poll sample for
each town separately. As shown, voters in each city exhibit a range of stated costs with a long
right tail. Although there is apparent bunching at zero, only 7 voters (4.4%) responded with a
stated cost of $0. On average, voters appear to possess little information about actual costs. Mean
stated costs for Cumberland, Plainville, and South Windsor are $198, $300, and $216, while
mean actual costs for these voters are $308, $45, and $243. 16 So, Cumberland and South
Windsor voters underestimate their private costs, while voters in Plainville drastically
overestimate their costs. We present an analogous figure for our CA MTurk sample in Figure 2.
Similarly, many respondents reported a low stated cost, but there is a long right tail that suggests
substantial overestimation of private costs. 17 Average stated costs for these respondents are
$98.78 relative to a weighted sample mean of actual costs of $15.06.
All densities have a fairly similar distribution with significant mass at small dollar
amounts, mass declining with dollar increases, and a long right tail. The similarity in distribution
16
Note that these mean actual costs differ from those presented in Table 1 because these are weighted sample
averages.
17
In the case of California and Plainville, the range of stated costs is large relative to the average true value. We
investigate accuracy in finer detail for those guessing small costs in Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2, which limits the
range to $500 in the NE Exit Poll Sample and $150 in the CA MTurk sample. The figures indicate that the vast
majority of voters perceive costs substantially different than actual costs.
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is notable given the significant differences in costs. This pattern may suggest a common
distribution of beliefs that is decoupled from the specifics of a given referendum.

4.1.2 Correlation with true cost
Next, we explore the correlation between stated and actual costs in a regression
framework to control for characteristics of the voter. In Table 3, we regress stated cost on actual
cost and control for a variety of individual characteristics for both of our survey samples. In
Column 1, we present unconditional correlation between stated and actual cost for our NE Exit
Poll, and find a negative but small and insignificant relationship between stated and actual cost.
We also explore the correlation between actual and stated costs for respondents who did not
answer the open-ended cost question, but did answer the multiple choice question. These results
are presented graphically in Figure A.3 and show virtually no correlation between stated and
actual costs, even when answers are constrained by reasonable choices in the “ballpark” of actual
costs. In Column 2, we add town fixed effects and the suite of individual characteristics from
Table 2. The results in Column 2 suggest that there is a positive and larger conditional
correlation, however this relationship is not statistically significant. None of our other voter
characteristics are meaningfully correlated with stated cost, suggesting that no single
characteristic changes the cost that a voter states in a systematic way. In Columns 3 and 4, we
repeat this analysis with our CA MTurk sample. 18 The unconditional correlation in Column 3 is
positive and somewhat large, but not statistically different from zero. When we add city fixed
effects and additional individual characteristics as controls in Column 4, the correlation between
stated and actual costs remains positive and statistically insignificant. Notably, no other
characteristics correlate significantly with stated cost in this specification, including an indicator
for whether the voter has already voted, which corroborates the findings from NE that there is
not any one group that routinely guesses high or low and misperception is spread throughout the
population.
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As noted previously, we trim our sample to include only respondents who reported a stated cost of $1000 or less
to remove extreme outliers. We perform a sensitivity check on this sample truncation in Table A.3 in the appendix
by re-estimating these correlations for the full sample (including all respondents) as well as respondents with stated
cost below $5000, $1000 (for comparison), and $500. The full, unrestricted sample produces nearly meaningless
results due to outliers with unbelievably high reported costs (i.e., orders of magnitude greater than the respondent’s
reported annual income). For stated costs of $5000, $1000, and $500, however, we find relatively strong agreement,
with statistically similar results across all groups.
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4.1.3 Determinants of misperception
Our descriptive analysis so far provides strong evidence that voters misperceive the costs
associated with voting for/against the referendums. We now construct several variables that
capture misperception empirically and explore the correlation between voter characteristics. We
define the following misperception variable, which is the empirical analog of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 in Section 2:
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 =

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

(6)

Using 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , we create several variables to explore misperception. First, we construct a dummy

variable for an “accurate” guess which we define as 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0.75,1.25] or, in other words, whether
voter’s stated cost fell within 25 percentage points of the actual value. For our CA MTurk

sample, because the actual value is defined by a range, we allow for a 25-percentage point buffer
above the maximum or below the minimum of that range. In our NE Exit Poll sample, 17.7% of
voters registered an accurate guess according to this definition, whereas it was 19.4% in our CA
MTurk sample. Additionally, we construct a binary variable for overperceiving costs equal to
one if 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 > 1 and zero otherwise. In our NE Exit Poll sample, 40.2% of voters overperceive their

private cost of the referendum. The same statistic for our CA MTurk sample is 55.3%.

To unpack the drivers of misperception, we regress several outcome variables, including
whether a voter registered a guess for the stated cost, as well as our two variables that capture
misperception of costs, on individual characteristics and town fixed effects. We estimate these
relationships using logit regression with sample weights to adjust our sample to the observed
referendum outcome.
Table 4 presents the results of the misperception analysis for both samples. Parameters
shown are marginal effects from our logit regression evaluated at sample mean values. Columns
1 – 3 show results for the NE Exit Poll sample and Columns 4 – 6 show results for the CA
MTurk sample. In Columns 1 and 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the
voter registered a guess at the bond cost. In Column 1, we find that neither whether the voter
approved the bond or whether they voted for a Democratic governor display an economically
meaningful correlation with the likelihood that the voter registered a cost guess. Income is
strongly positively correlated with guessing; middle income voters were about 18 percentage
points more likely to guess than low income and high-income voters were 31 percentage points
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more likely. Additionally, financial literacy increases the likelihood that a voter registered a
guess by 17 percentage points for each financial question answered correctly. Our measures of
education, whether the voter rents, political knowledge, and age are all statistically insignificant
and point estimates are substantively small. The parallel analysis for the CA MTurk sample
indicates some similarities and some differences. Similar to the exit poll, financial literacy
increased the likelihood that a voter guessed at their cost, and education, whether the voter rents,
political knowledge, and age are all statistically insignificant. In contrast, we find that
respondents who voted to approve the referendum were less likely (by 11.8 percentage points) to
report a cost guess and income did not correlate with guessing. While Democrats and
Republicans have similar likelihood of guessing, as in NE, we find that political independents
were more likely to report a cost guess in CA.
These results suggest that there are some small differences in the population who
answered the open-ended cost question. Particularly, more financially literate and wealthier
respondents (in the NE Exit Poll) are more likely to answer that question. This brings up a
question of selection into registering a guess: we might believe that respondents who answered
the cost question will be more informed voters because they took the time to consider and answer
the open-ended question. But, as we show, even this sample of potentially more informed voters
who guessed at their costs did not report accurate costs. Further, all of the nonrespondents to the
open-ended question answered the multiple-choice choice question, but there is little correlation
between stated and actual costs among this set of voters as well (as shown in Figure A.3).
In Columns 2 and 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the voter
registered a guess that was accurate, defined as being with 25% of the correct value (NE) or
range of values (CA). In Column 2, among all the variables considered, only the effect of renters
is statistically significant. Renters are 11 percentage points less likely than homeowners to state
costs accurately, which could reflect a disconnect between paying rent and property taxes (Oates
2005). 19 Interestingly, financial literacy, political knowledge, and education are not correlated
with accuracy. In Column 5 (CA), many of the same variables as with NE do not have a
statistically significant effect on accuracy: approval, democrat, age, education, and political
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Because we anticipate that renters may not have good information on how bond costs translate into tax burdens,
we perform a sensitivity check of the previous analysis excluding renters. This analysis is presented in online
appendix Table A.6.
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knowledge. The results do suggest that political independents are less likely to state an accurate
private cost (by 11.6 percentage points) despite being more likely to register a guess. We also
find that respondents with incomes greater than $100,000 were about 10 percentage points less
likely to answer the cost question correctly. Respondents who answered the financial literacy
question correctly were about 8 percentage points more likely to answer correctly. Notably,
having already voted does not influence whether the respondent reported their private cost
correctly. 20
In Columns 3 and 6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the voter
overperceived costs (stated > actual). 21 In Column 3 (NE), the only statistically significant effect
is our measure of financial literacy, which reduces the likelihood of overperception by 11
percentage points. On average, voters who approved the bond were less likely to overperceive
the bond cost by about 17 percentage points, which could be related to valuation, but this effect
is not statistically significant. In Column 6 (CA), we find that respondents who approve of the
referendum, who have already voted, are in the highest income bracket, and have high political
knowledge are all less likely to overperceive. Political independents are more likely to
overperceive, and financial literacy is uncorrelated with overperception.
Overall, in Table 4, we find very little consistency across columns and across samples in
what correlates with cost perception accuracy. This finding bolsters the conclusion from Table 3
that no single group is more or less knowledgeable about true costs and that misperception is
widely and evenly spread throughout the voting population.

4.2 Voter choice
The second thrust of analysis is to examine vote choices, with a focus on the effect of
cost. In order to make costs comparable across referendums, which in turns enables WTP
calculation, we use annual costs in our model. Plainville, MA and California residents reported
annual cost guesses, but Cumberland, RI and South Windsor, CT residents were asked about
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In Table A.4 and A.5, we explore the sensitivity of our definition of “accurate” perceptions. For the NE Exit Poll
Sample, our results for +/-10 percentage points are largely consistent with the +/- 25 percentage points definition.
When we expand the definition of accuracy to +/- 50 percentage points, we find that renters are even less likely to
register accurate guesses, which suggests that renters likely possess very little knowledge of the costs that accrue to
property owners.
21
Note that, by symmetry, the coefficients in Column 3 can be multiplied by -1 and interpreted as changes in the
likelihood that the voter underperceives her private costs.
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total costs. We convert these total bond costs to annual using an assumption of a 10-year
payback with 1% interest. 22 Following our framework in Section 2, we estimate the following
model of voter choice:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 𝜸𝜸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(7)

where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to one if voter i voted for the referendum and zero

otherwise. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the annual dollar value of either the stated or actual cost for voter i's

household . 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 is a vector of voter attributes, including partisan affiliation, income, education,
age, and the two measures of financial literacy and political knowledge. 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 also includes

indicator variables for town or city, which capture differences in the referendums and other
observable and unobservable differences in the towns. We estimate this equation using logit with
sample weights for our NE Exit Poll sample and our CA MTurk sample separately and using
stated or actual cost separately. 23
In Table 5, we present marginal effects from estimation of Equation (7) evaluated at
sample averages. Columns 1 and 2 present results for NE Exit Poll sample and Columns 3 and 4
are for the CA MTurk sample. In Column 1, we include stated, or perceived, cost as the cost
variable although we divide actual and stated costs by 1000 to make coefficients more legible.
The marginal effect is -0.28, which is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. The sign of this
coefficient conforms with our intuition: when perceived costs increase, voters are less likely to
approve the bond. This is akin to a demand curve sloping down. The magnitude implies that, on
average, a $1000 increase in the annual perceived cost of the public good reduces the likelihood
that an individual votes in favor of the referendum by 28 percentage points, all else equal. Of
course, a $1000 increase in cost is unrealistic since the average annual stated cost for our NE
Exit Poll sample is $113 (average annual actual cost is $35). In more sensible units, a $10 dollar
increase in perceived cost decreases the likelihood that an individual votes in favor of the
referendum by 0.28 percentage points. This effect makes intuitive sense and its magnitude
should reveal the tradeoff voters are willing to make to supply the public good. In Column 2, we
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We do not know the actual horizons and rates used by Cumberland and South Windsor, but 10-year and 1% are
common values in the municipal bond market. We perform sensitivity checks on these assumptions in the online
appendix and results are nearly identical.
23
Equation 7 with actual cost mirrors the specifications used by many observational studies of voter choice (Vossler
and Kerkvliet 2003, Burkhardt and Chan 2017, Vander Naald and Cameron 2017, Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz
2022), which is our objective. It is important to note that this is a descriptive regression model and may not have a
causal interpretation because there may be unobserved determinants of approval that are correlated with cost.
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include actual cost as the cost variable. The marginal effect is a positive 134 percentage point
increase for a $1000 increase in stated cost and is statistically insignificant. The sign of this
effect is counterintuitive as it violates the law of demand. However, the confidence intervals are
large suggesting that actual cost has no real bearing on voter behavior. The magnitude implies
that a $10 increase in the annual actual cost of the public good increases the likelihood that an
individual votes in favor of the referendum by 1.34 percentage points, but this estimate is
statistically similar to zero.
Transitioning to the CA sample, Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 have the same pattern, we
include stated cost and actual cost sequentially in the voter choice regression. In Column 3, we
estimate a negative relationship between referendum approval and stated cost. A $10 increase in
stated annual cost reduces the likelihood that a respondent voted for the referendum by 0.17
percentage points. This effect is similar in magnitude when compared to the NE Exit Poll
estimate in Column 1, but it is not statistically different from zero. In Column 4, we estimate a
positive and insignificant relationship between approval and actual cost. In this specification, the
magnitude of the effect is similar to that of the NE sample – a $10 increase in actual annual costs
is associated with a 1.50 percentage point increase in the likelihood of approval.
To summarize, across all four specifications, only the coefficient on stated costs in the
NE Exit Poll sample exhibits a statistically significant effect. For actual costs (in both samples)
and stated costs (in the CA MTurk sample), the cost coefficients are not statistically different
from zero. Further, actual costs in both samples have a counterintuitive sign. Overall, actual cost
has no statistical influence on voter approval, however this may not be because voters are
indifferent to costs when deciding how to vote. Rather, our results are suggestive of imperfect
information. Voters misperceive costs and they may determine approval based in part on those
misperceived costs. We can discern this conclusion, in part, because the coefficient on perceived
cost is statistically significant and the expected sign in our NE Exit Poll sample.
Only a few of the other estimated marginal effects are statistically significant. Results
suggest that Democrats are more likely (and, to a lesser extent, Independents) to vote approve in
both samples, which is consistent with the party’s general ideology on public goods and
government spending, and consistent with many prior public good voting studies (e.g., Holian
and Kahn 2015, Altonji et al. 2016). We also find that financial literacy negatively affects
approval by a large margin in both samples. For each financial literacy question answered
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correctly, approval drops 12-16 percentage points, on average. To the best of our knowledge, no
other paper has tested how financial literacy correlates with referendum approval. It is difficult to
speculate about why this might be because we are conditioning on understanding of costs, and
through Table 4 we have already established that financial literacy only weakly correlates with
correctly perceived costs. One possibility is that voters who are well versed in banking, interest
rates, etc., have a kneejerk adverse reaction to spending money. For the CA MTurk sample, we
also find that political knowledge and having already voted also reduces the likelihood that
respondents vote to approve the referendum, and a college degree is increases the likelihood, the
latter perhaps due to a familiarity with stem cell research or support for research in general.

4.3 Willingness-to-pay estimates
In addition to estimating the determinants of voter choice, we can use these results to
estimate willingness to pay for these public goods. The objective of this analysis is not to
calculate a true WTP for the public goods in question, but to illustrate the magnitude of the
wedge between voters’ WTP for public goods using perceived versus actual private costs.
Economic theory would predict a positive willingness-to-pay for desirable public goods. A
negative WTP would indicate public bads – provision that actually harms society.
Following the method developed by Hanemann (1984, 1989) and used in the context of
voting by Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003), Burkhardt and Chan (2017), Lang and PearsonMerkowitz (2022), among others, WTP is calculated as follows:
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 =

1

−𝛽𝛽̂

� �

ln(1 + 𝑒𝑒 (𝛽𝛽0 +𝑿𝑿 𝜸𝜸�) )

(8)

� is a vector
�, and 𝛽𝛽̂ come from the logit results of the estimated voter choice model. 𝑿𝑿
where 𝛼𝛼�, 𝜸𝜸
of sample average values, and thus we estimate WTP for the average voter in our sample. We

calculate WTP separately for the models using stated and actual costs, and we calculate standard
errors using the delta method.
We present our estimates of WTP at the bottom of Table 5. For the NE Exit Poll sample,
our estimated WTP using stated costs is $1,011 with a standard error of $371. When using actual
costs, however, we calculate a WTP of -$163 with a standard error of $318. So, estimated WTP
using stated costs makes economic sense and is consistent with these referendums passing by
large margins. In contrast, our estimate of WTP using actual cost is senseless because it implies
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that referendum passage reduces welfare. For the CA MTurk sample, our estimates illustrate a
similar story as the NE Exit Poll sample, WTP is $1,143 using stated costs and -$114 using
actual costs. Notably, across both samples, the sign for WTP based on actual costs is negative,
which is unbelievable primarily because all referendums passed, suggesting that voters valued
the public goods positively. WTP based on stated cost, however, has a sensible sign across both
samples, though is larger in magnitude than would be expected for projects of this scale. All
WTP estimates, however, do have large standard errors.

4.4 Robustness checks and sensitivity analysis
We implement several sensitivity checks for our analysis, some of which have been
mentioned already, and present these results in the online appendix. In Table A.8, we present
coefficients for the voter choice model except estimated using a linear probability model.
Coefficients on stated cost and actual cost are very similar to Table 5, though in the NE Exit poll
the coefficient on stated cost is now statistically significant at the 1% level and the coefficient on
actual cost increases in magnitude but is not statistically different from the logit estimate. We
find other variables, such as partisan affiliation, financial literacy, and political knowledge, to
have similar effects on vote choice as in the logit specification. 24
Given some uncertainty about cost calculations with the New England referendums, we
additionally assess the sensitivity of results to varying (a) the conversion rate from rental rate to
property value and (b) the terms of the annualized bond cost (using combinations of 10- to 15year payback horizons at 1% or 2% interest rates). Our results are qualitatively identical across
different rental conversion rates, which only affects the actual cost variable (as shown in Table
A.9), and for three different combinations of bond horizons and interest rates (as shown in
Tables A.10–A.12).
In our last robustness check, we revisit our sample truncation for the CA MTurk sample
to explore how extreme outliers affect our voter choice estimates. In Table A.13, we present
24

In the NE Exit Poll sample, only 9.1% of our sample are renters, and all of them voted to approve, so the logit
cannot estimate a marginal effect for renters. One advantage of the linear probability model is that we can include
renters as a variable for the NE Exit Poll sample. In Table A.8, the coefficient on renter is positive and large in
magnitude in both columns, and is statistically significant in Column 2. This is a relatively common finding in
public good voting, which Oates (2005) dubbed the “renter effect.” Oates argues that homeowners are more likely
than renters to be aware of their tax obligations related to local public spending and thus less likely to approve.
However, in this setting, we are controlling for perceived or actual cost, which calls into question the traditional
explanation for renters’ voting behavior.

23

results for the voter choice regressions that include four different samples: the full sample,
including all respondents to the MTurk survey, as well as samples that exclude respondents with
stated costs greater than $5000, $1000 (our main sample), and $500. Across all samples, none of
the cost coefficients are statistically different from zero except for stated cost in the full sample,
which includes annual stated costs that exceed respondent annual income. The magnitudes do
change across samples, however. For the full sample, the stated cost coefficient is -0.00029 and
increases to -0.031 for the <$5000 sample, -0.17 for the <$1000 sample, and then decreases
to -0.019 for the <$500 sample. This comparison suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that removing
extreme outliers in stated cost is important for determining how stated costs affect referendum
approval. The coefficient on actual cost is -1.02 for the full sample and -0.39 for the <$5000
sample, which is the opposite sign than our primary results in Table 5. The coefficient becomes
positive for the <$1000 sample and increases to 2.75 in the <$500 sample. Despite this sign flip
as a result of the sample truncation, the standard errors on the actual cost coefficient are quite
large, which suggests no statistical difference between any of these cost coefficients. This
sensitivity test continues to imply that, for the CA MTurk sample, costs are not a strong
determinant of voter choice.

5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents primary data collected from voters immediately after voting as well
as reported voting behavior via an online survey. We elicited incentivized estimates of private
costs of public goods referendums, as well as approval of said referendums and political and
socioeconomic information. We provide strong evidence that the majority of voters misperceive
the private costs of providing public goods through referendums. We find no evidence of
systematic under- or over-estimation of costs, nor any specific type of voter who is more or less
informed. Given the widespread imperfect information, it would be reasonable to conclude that
voters do not consider costs when voting. However, we find this to be false. Analyzing voter
approval, we find that perceived cost does affect approval in one of our samples and is negative,
as would be expected.
There are two implications. First, these findings limit the degree to which voting behavior
might reveal the value of public goods, unless information about perceived cost is collected.
Using voting behavior and actual costs to infer willingness-to-pay for public goods hinges
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critically on the assumption that voters possess full information. Thus, any valuation method that
assumes full information about actual costs may provide misleading results.
Second, because voters misperceive costs but still partially base approval on costs, they
may be making errors at the ballot box. Information provision could correct both internalities
(e.g., voting for the referendum when in fact a voter would prefer not to provide the public good
at its true private cost) and externalities (e.g., voting for the referendum and incurring its cost on
other taxpayers). To assess the magnitude of this possibility in our setting, we provide a back-ofthe-envelope analysis. Using our primary voter choice regression estimates with stated cost as an
independent variable (Columns 1 and 3, Table 5), we predict each individual’s vote based on 1)
stated costs and 2) what their vote would have been if they had perfect information about their
true costs. 25 Thus, we have two predicted votes for each individual. Using these predictions, we
can calculate how many respondents would have changed their vote upon receiving updated,
accurate information. For our NE Exit Poll sample, we estimate that 5.5% (SE = 1.8%) of voters
would have changed their vote with perfect information. Now, is 5.5% of voters making an
internality error enough to cause an externality of the referendum outcome being counter to
median preferences? Recall that our referendums in the NE Exit Poll sample passed by
approximately 75%, so a 5.5 percentage point change in votes is not consequential for these
outcomes. For closer referendums, however, it is feasible that reconciling cost misperceptions
could be pivotal for providing the quantity of the public good that accords with voter
preferences. Within our CA MTurk sample, the same statistic suggests that 2.9% (SE = 0.93%)
of respondents would change their vote if given perfect information. This statistic is smaller
because the difference in stated and actual costs is smaller in the CA MTurk sample. That said,
the CA referendum passed with 51.1% approval, which suggests that a 2.9% change in voter
choice is nontrivial when considering the implications of referendums that pass (or do not pass)
by narrow margins.
There is no comprehensive database of all referendums held in the United States, but we
use a variety of sources to assess how frequently referendums fall within 5% of the passing
threshold. Of referendums regarding land conservation, 22.8% are within 5% (Trust for Public

25

We assign a vote of approve if the predicted probability is greater than or equal to 0.5. The predicted probability
with true costs is calculated using the model coefficients from Table 5, Column 1, but using the values of true costs
instead of stated costs.
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Land); of municipal school spending referendums in California, 34.8% are within 5% (Cellini et
al. 2010); and across a range of jurisdiction types and spending purposes in Ohio, between 17.4%
and 38.1% of referendums are within 5% (Isen 2014). 26 The number of close outcomes suggests
that externalities of individual cost misperceptions are likely to be present in many referendums
across the country.
One concern about our analysis is that our studied referendums may not be the best
examples of voters needing to be well-informed. Average annual costs are modest and only one
of the outcomes was close. These conditions may allow voters to be uninformed without adverse
consequences. However, this argument relies on the assumption that voters know that costs are
modest, and our empirical analysis clearly shows the majority of voters misperceive costs and
many voters believe costs are onerous. Further, it assumes that voters are aware of how close
outcomes will be and that they are motivated by closeness, which have been shown to be false
(Coate et al. 2008, Gerber et al. 2020). While information on the distribution of personal costs of
referendums does not exist, we have no reason to believe these costs are anomalously low. 27
Going forward, the findings presented here provide a strong rationale for states, counties,
and municipalities to provide significantly enhanced information about private costs of
referendums to voters. However, research is needed to understand how voters internalize cost
information and how to best present the information. A useful starting point would be the
decades of contingent valuation research, which emphasizes the critical importance of
communicating details of cost and making them salient (Johnston et al. 2017).
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All statistics are authors’ calculations. Trust for Public Land’s Land Vote Database is publicly available. Cellini et
al. graciously posted their data and code. From these two sources, we calculated the exact proportion within 5%.
Isen (2014) presented many histograms by vote share, and we were able to estimate the proportion within 5% from
these graphs.
27
For example, about two-thirds of Massachusetts’ municipalities have voted to adopt the CPA, and a 1% property
tax surcharge (like Plainville) is a common funding amount. Further, California’s $5.5 billion bond is in the middle
of the range of California bonds studied by Burkhardt and Chan (2017).
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Distribution of stated cost by town – NE Exit Poll Sample

Notes: Vertical dashed red line equals town-specific average actual cost for sample respondents (from left to right:
$308.47, $45.20, and $242.70). One extreme observation is excluded for purposes of scale ($7500 in South
Windsor).

Figure 2: Distribution of stated cost – CA MTurk Sample

Notes: Vertical dashed red line equals average actual cost for CA sample respondents ($15.06).
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Table 1: Referendum characteristics
Average cost per
household

Location

Purpose

Financing

Approval rate

Cumberland,
Rhode Island

Street pavement improvements

$2.5 million bond

$184.71 total
[$19.50 per year]

88.0%

Plainville,
Massachusetts

Community Preservation Act (open space,
affordable housing, historic preservation)

1% increase in property taxes,
applied above $100K in value

$30.80 per year

66.0%

South Windsor,
Connecticut

Open space acquisition

$2 million bond

$205.44 total
[$21.69 per year]

73.9%

California

Stem cell research

$5.5 billion bond

$20.53 per year

51.1%

Notes: Average cost per household is calculated based on all residents, not just survey respondents. Plainville and California provide annual
costs. Annual costs for Cumberland and South Windsor are calculated assuming a 10-year payback period and a 1% interest rate. All
referendums had a pass threshold of 50% approval.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
All respondents
Panel A: NE Exit Poll Sample
Answered cost question (%)
Actual cost ($)
Stated cost ($)
Correct stated cost (within 25pp) (%)
Approved (%)
Voted Democrat for governor (%)
College degree (%)
Age (years)
Income (50k-100k)
Income (>100k)
Renter (%)
Financial literacy (# correct of 2)
Political knowledge (# correct of 1)
Cumberland (%)
Plainville (%)
South Windsor (%)
Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

45.3
167.3

49.8
144.9

77.2
48.1
70.4
52.1
0.3
0.5
15.3
1.3
0.6
26.5
37.9
35.7

42.0
50.0
45.7
16.9
0.5
0.5
36.0
0.8
0.5
44.2
48.6
48.0

347

Panel B: CA MTurk Sample
Answered cost question (%)
Actual cost ($)
Stated cost ($)
Correct stated cost (within 25pp) (%)
Approved ($)
Democrat (%)
Independent (%)
College degree (%)
Age (years)
Income (50k-100k)
Income (>100k)
Renter (%)
Financial literacy (# correct of 2)
Political knowledge (# correct of 1)
Los Angeles (%)
San Francisco (%)

Answered Cost
Question
Mean
St. Dev.
100.0
186.9
242.7
17.7
76.2
46.6
76.3
51.6
0.3
0.6
9.1
1.5
0.6
28.2
37.8
34.0

0.0
162.0
459.4
38.3
42.7
50.0
42.7
15.5
0.5
0.5
28.8
0.7
0.5
45.1
48.7
47.5

157

83.5
14.5

37.1
15.1

51.1
39.7
21.1
72.3
40.5
0.4
0.2
43.6
1.5
0.8
37.8
16.2

50.0
49.0
40.8
44.8
13.3
0.5
0.4
49.7
0.7
0.4
48.5
36.9

100.0
15.1
98.8
19.4
51.1
39.2
23.9
71.9
40.7
0.4
0.2
45.1
1.6
0.8
36.8
17.5

0.0
16.0
164.5
39.6
50.1
48.9
42.7
45.0
13.5
0.5
0.4
49.8
0.7
0.4
48.3
38.1

Observations
428
332
Notes: All statistics are calculated using sampling weights to be representative. Answered Cost Question
refers to the sample of respondents that answered the open-ended cost elicitation question.
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Table 3: Correlation between stated and actual costs

Independent Variables
Actual cost ($)
Democrat
Independent
Income (50-100k)
Income (>100k)
College
Age
Renter
Financial literacy
Political knowledge
Already Voted

Dependent Variable: Stated Cost ($)
NE Exit Poll Sample
CA MTurk Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.097
0.466
1.111
1.687
(0.246)
(0.323)
(1.043)
(1.615)
-64.530
-11.384
(79.456)
(20.765)
-9.229
(22.811)
203.245
12.972
(132.173)
(24.105)
-47.634
-12.685
(114.071)
(42.032)
-31.297
-47.809*
(124.344)
(24.555)
-2.561
0.875
(3.282)
(0.763)
-74.801
14.983
(103.490)
(20.254)
-74.074
-27.430
(62.443)
(16.798)
72.691
-60.907*
(105.783)
(34.101)
-51.128**
(20.781)

Observations
157
157
332
332
R-squared
0.001
0.090
0.012
0.109
City FE
Y
Y
Notes: For the NE Exit Poll Sample, "Democrat" is defined as whether respondent voted for
the democratic gubernatorial candidate; for the CA MTurk Sample, "Democrat" or
"Independent" are self-reported political affiliations. Constant term included but not
displayed. All regressions are estimated using sampling weights to be representative.
Constant term omitted from table. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** represent significance at p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels.
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Table 4: Unpacking the drivers of voter misperception

Independent Variables
Approved
Democrat

NE Exit Poll Sample
(1)
(2)
Correct stated
Answered
cost
cost question
(+/- 25pp)
-0.001
-0.004
(0.071)
(0.069)
-0.027
0.028
(0.061)
(0.058)

(3)
Stated >
Actual
-0.171
(0.117)
0.152
(0.095)

Independent
Income (50-100k)
Income (>100k)
College
Age
Renter
Financial literacy
Political knowledge

0.183**
(0.086)
0.311***
(0.076)
0.015
(0.067)
0.000
(0.002)
-0.070
(0.090)
0.172***
(0.042)
0.024
(0.061)

-0.096
(0.079)
-0.051
(0.112)
-0.008
(0.063)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.112*
(0.061)
0.042
(0.043)
-0.001
(0.055)

0.094
(0.162)
-0.009
(0.160)
-0.167
(0.110)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.064
(0.175)
-0.111*
(0.062)
-0.025
(0.105)

Already Voted

CA MTurk Sample
(4)
(5)
Correct stated
Answered
cost
cost question
(+/- 25pp)
-0.124***
0.029
(0.036)
(0.049)
-0.022
-0.059
(0.036)
(0.060)
0.088**
-0.122**
(0.036)
(0.048)
0.007
-0.044
(0.026)
(0.050)
0.015
-0.105**
(0.036)
(0.049)
0.005
0.058
(0.033)
(0.055)
0.001
0.002
(0.001)
(0.002)
0.039
0.039
(0.026)
(0.054)
0.071***
0.081*
(0.025)
(0.044)
0.038
0.062
(0.033)
(0.053)
0.029
-0.002
(0.024)
(0.046)

(6)
Stated >
Actual
-0.108
(0.067)
0.071
(0.080)
0.144*
(0.081)
-0.094
(0.079)
-0.399***
(0.086)
-0.038
(0.080)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.042
(0.068)
-0.062
(0.056)
-0.150**
(0.070)
-0.158**
(0.066)

Observations
347
157
157
428
332
332
Log pseudolikelihood
-211.1
-62.02
-86.61
-150.9
-165.5
-206.0
City FE
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Notes: Coefficients presented are marginal effects from logit regression evaluated at sample means. For the NE Exit Poll Sample,
"Democrat" is defined as whether respondent voted for the democratic gubernatorial candidate; for the CA MTurk Sample,
"Democrat" or "Independent" are self-reported political affiliations. All regressions are estimated using sampling weights to be
representative. Constant term omitted from table. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance
at p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels.
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Table 5: Voter choice regressions and willingness to pay estimates
Dependent Variable: Approve (1=yes)
NE Exit Poll Sample
CA MTurk Sample
Independent Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Stated cost ($1000s)
-0.28**
-0.17
(0.12)
(0.22)
Actual cost ($1000s)
1.34
1.50
(2.26)
(2.92)
Democrat
0.17**
0.19***
0.45***
0.46***
(0.070)
(0.069)
(0.067)
(0.067)
Independent
0.22***
0.22***
(0.084)
(0.084)
Income (50-100k)
-0.18
-0.19
-0.071
-0.084
(0.26)
(0.23)
(0.082)
(0.084)
Income (>100k)
-0.21
-0.19
-0.090
-0.14
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.093)
(0.13)
College
-0.0081
-0.0081
0.15*
0.16*
(0.089)
(0.085)
(0.084)
(0.083)
Age
0.00060
0.0015
-0.0048*
-0.0048*
(0.0026)
(0.0026)
(0.0029)
(0.0029)
Renter
-0.057
-0.056
(0.074)
(0.074)
Financial literacy
-0.14**
-0.12*
-0.16***
-0.15***
(0.070)
(0.065)
(0.056)
(0.055)
Political knowledge
-0.0061
-0.042
-0.24***
-0.23***
(0.081)
(0.082)
(0.087)
(0.089)
Already Voted
-0.19***
-0.18***
(0.068)
(0.068)
Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
City FE

157
Y
-70.5

157
Y
-74.1

WTP estimate ($)

332
Y
-190

332
Y
-189.8

1010.63
-163.03
1143.0
-113.6
(370.65)
(317.74)
(1464.94)
(236.0)
Notes: Coefficients presented are marginal effects from logit regression evaluated at sample means.
For the NE Exit Poll Sample, "Democrat" is defined as whether respondent voted for the democratic
gubernatorial candidate; for the CA MTurk Sample, "Democrat" or "Independent" are self-reported
political affiliations. All regressions are estimated using sampling weights to be representative.
Constant term omitted from table. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent significance at p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels.
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